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Neo- instead of post-Fordism: 
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Abstract The paper consists of two parts, the first focusing on the institutional heritage 
of an innovative work organization (teamworking) that emerged in state-socialist firms in 
Hungary in the 1980s. The second part of the analysis concentrates on the impacts of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) on work organization, with special regard to the 
employees’ role in task structuring in the post-socialist economy during the 1990s.
The experience with the so-called ‘Inside Contracting Groups' (Hungarian acronym: 
VGMK) in the 1980s actually meant an innovative attempt to mobilize human resources 
by letting employees establish their autonomous working groups after their regular 
working time. Almost a tenth of the industrial workforce participated in this nation-wide 
social experiment. The technical-professional and social-cultural learning processes in 
these autonomous working groups have produced the following ‘spill-over effect’: these 
‘proto-entrepreneurs’ within the state-socialist firms became micro- or small business 
owners after the collapse of the state-socialist political and economic regime. During the 
1990s, the first decade of the emerging market economy in Hungary, massive FDI arrived 
in the country and had a strong impact on the diffusion of organizational innovations in 
labour processes, too (e.g. teamworking, cost centres, TQM, IT use, ISO 9000, etc.). 
‘Leading-edge’ management practices in foreign-owned firms play the role of ‘external 
benchmarking’ for Hungarian firms, but, beside the transfer of some organizational 
innovations in labour processes (e.g. increasing employee participation in the quality 
assurance), it is hard to identify in the indigenous firms innovative practices like that of the 
VGMK in the 1980s.
Keywords Institutional heritage; inside contracting groups; autonomous working 
groups; technical-professional and social-cultural learning processes; employee 
participation; new-Fordism; leading-edge management practices.
Introduction: short historical overview
According to the most widely shared mainstream view, enterprise management in large 
state-socialist firms became par excellence ‘Homo Administrative’, whose production 
function was directly to control and co-ordinate labour. Lacking ownership and 
innovative functions -  in contrast to capitalist firms -  managers badly needed such 
‘social-organizational skills’, which guaranteed them maximum financial resources via 
fighting with central actors in the ‘mega-hierarchies’ of the communist party and state 
(bureaucracies) in the course of the redistribution of resources (Chavance, 1995).
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The other co-ordination-related task of firms’ management was to keep the social peace 
by tolerating lower standards of blue-collar workers at the shopfloor level. In other 
words, managers of state-socialist firms, under the conditions of the so-called ‘shortage 
economy’ (Komai, 1982), essentially practised the ‘production function’ only and had 
not enough autonomy to fulfil the functions related to ownership, allocations of resources 
(investment) and innovation. The representatives of ‘mega-hierarchies’ expected them to 
behave like ‘civil servants’ whose key ambition is to fulfil planned targets and directly 
to control labour.
In addition, we should mention that, in the archetype state-socialist firm, available skill 
and manpower were not necessarily treated as a pool of resources and routines that could be 
used in innovative ways for better business performance. The emphasis in socialist firms 
was on the size of physical resources (e.g. size of plants, number of machines, number of 
employees, the size of social welfare facilities, etc.) and the composition of manpower was 
somewhere at the end of the list. At the same time, workers’ motivation and the skill of 
management were generally underestimated among production factors. The political- 
ideological rationality behind this treatment of managerial labour processes was the 
stipulation that in a classless society -  free from the basic interest conflicts of labour and 
capital -  the various social-professional groups within the business organization (just as in 
society as a whole) share the same interest: to fulfil the plan targets. In this conflict- 
free world of state-socialist firms, a manager was treated as the ‘No. 1. Administrator’ of 
the State, who had to follow the plans’ indicators with the help of the trade unions, 
both being under the political control of the ‘mega-hierarchies’ (party and government).
This view of management and business organization was first challenged by the 
revolution of 1956 and then by the ‘core workers’ ’ significant (informal) bargaining power 
in the labour process, which questioned the validity of the ideological view, briefly 
presented above, of an ‘interest and conflict free’ society (Hethy and Mako, 1973). These 
factors and the macro-rigidity of the state-socialist economy -  under the pressure of the oil 
crisis -  together forced the political and economic leadership of the country to combine 
state planning with various elements of the market and also to modernize company 
management.
The first part of the paper presents some lessons from the various types of liberalization- 
modemization efforts initiated at the company level during the 1980s (Dobak and 
Tari, 1996), focusing on the large-scale social-organizational experiences of teamwork in 
the form of ‘Inside Contracting Groups’ (hereinafter referred to as VGMKs, the Hungarian 
acronym). This company-level movement to implement autonomous group work in 
the former state-socialist economies from the early 1980s well illustrates the diversity of 
development paths and the role of this kind of teamwork in developing the participatory 
culture of the Hungarian workforce in the labour process. Using the experiences of various 
international comparative studies carried out during the 1990s, the second part of the paper 
informs the reader about the diffusion of the neo-Fordist organization of work based 
on the limited participation of workers in the work organization. However, when 
comparing this limited level of employee participation in the labour process (e.g. in the 
form of workers’ involvement in quality assurance), we find that Hungarian workers have 
greater responsibility in quality assurance than workers in the other associated countries 
(e.g. Poland and Slovenia). At the same time, in the diffusion of such ‘leading-edge’ 
organizational practices as design teams, cost centres, group work, Hungarian-owned 
firms are lagging behind foreign-owned ones. Lessons drawn from both of these 
examinations call attention to the slow-down of dynamism in creating high-involvement 
working systems such as teamworking in Hungarian companies in comparison to both 
foreign-owned firms and Hungarian firms of the 1980s.
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Institutional legacy of the past: inherited patterns of co-operation 
(experiences with VGMKs in the 1980s)
Group work became favoured in the Western business community when successful 
patterns had been observed in Japanese and Swedish workplace practices. It is less 
known that formalized group-work initiatives (with own cost accounting structure and 
extremely flexible use of manpower and skill, practically creating special profit centres 
within the firm) were institutionalized in Hungarian state-socialist firms in the 1980s. 
Both the company-level managers and the economic policy makers of the country 
expected that this ‘micro-flexibility’ would increase the autonomy of working groups in 
business organizations, improve the efficiency of the state firms and decrease the macro­
rigidity of the economic system without changing the power structure.
At the beginning of the 1980s, these inside contracting groups (VGMKs), involving 
nearly 200,000 mainly blue-collar workers, participated in this form of autonomous working 
group. This meant 11.5 per cent of the full-time industrial workers, and the introduction of 
this form of work organization met with relatively little opposition. The VGMKs operated 
after regular working hours and fully replaced company managements’ need for overtime 
work. Their members were volunteers and these groups bargained with management on the 
price of work contracts without the interference of either the trade union or the party 
organization (Stark, 1985, 1986; Mako and Simonyi, 1992; Grabher, 1995).
To better understand the motives of management in implementing this ‘high- 
involvement’ working system, it is worth briefly describing the operational environment of 
state-socialist firms in the so-called shortage economy.
Given the well-known difficulties of the state-socialist economy in material supply, the 
slackness in delivery and co-operation, the quality problems, the labour shortage and the long 
deadlines for the procurement of machinery, unprotected buyers tried to improve their 
situation and overcome their difficulties in a variety of ways. The specific solutions, among 
them the application of so-called ‘enforced innovation’ and ‘enforced autonomy’ in the 
labour process, played a significant part in maintaining the continuity of production and thus 
upgrading the role of workshop-specific abilities and skills, both technical as well as 
co-operative. The majority of firms were under-financed and, in spite of this ‘enforced 
innovation’ or ‘enforced autonomy’, the quality of management was underdeveloped. These 
shortcomings in the shortage economy forced managers to run their business as ‘a just-in- 
case system to hoard physical resources, which is in contrast to the just-in-time system 
pioneered by Japanese. As a result, excess physical resources can often be found’ in socialist 
firms (Peng and Heath, 1996: 508). The symptoms of inefficiency in the manufacturing 
processes in the former socialist countries are well illustrated by the so-called Komai ratios. 
These ratios are indicators of input inventories versus output inventories: higher ratios 
signal a strong resource-hoarding approach adopted by the socialist management in contrast 
with the opposite pattern of managerial behaviour in market economies. Table 1 illustrates 
the systematic differences between the stronger safety-net ambition of socialist managers in 
contrast to the downsizing attitudes of managers in capitalist firms.
To overcome some of the anomalies of production mentioned, enterprise management 
introduced these inside contracting groups, or VGMKs, working after regular working 
time. Via this organizational tool, management got rid of almost all human problems 
of supervising production, particularly the psychologically and socially most ‘costly’ 
functions, like organizing work and maintaining discipline at the workplace. Managers’ 
workloads were also reduced in quantitative terms, while the VGMKs turned out products 
of higher quality at less cost, and, too, planning with them was more reliable than with 
external co-operating partners.
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Table 1 The ‘Kornai ratios’ of input versus output stocks: international comparison
Manufacturing firms 1981-5
Planned economies
Bulgaria 5.07
China -
Czechoslovakia 3.07
Hungary 6.10
Poland 4.49
Soviet Union 3.16
Market economies
Canada 0.92
Japan 1.09
Sweden 0.89
United Kingdom 1.02
United States 1.02
West Germany 0.71
Source : Kornai (1992: 250), cited in Peng and Heath (1996: 508)
To build, operate and explore a set of relations different from the clearly defined 
over-hierarchical organizational structure of full-time employment based on maximum 
specialization of individual jobs, required considerable efforts from VGMK members. 
A large part of them acquired in turn a kind of organizational culture of how to 
manage human relations within the working teams. This practice enabled participants 
in these work settings to compare, evaluate and criticize different models of the division 
of labour and manpower use, namely those prevailing in full-time jobs. It was widely 
recognized, for instance, that clear boundaries between certain divisions of organization 
(e.g. production, internal material transport and handling, quality control, maintenance, 
programming of production, etc.) were only of administrative relevance but did not 
function properly in reality. VGMK members organized their activities within 
organizational networks, integrating both horizontal and hierarchical relations within 
the frameworks of their amorphous relationships of mutual dependence.
The operation of these inside contracting groups was governed by the principle of 
high-trust relations based on thinking in terms of the ‘entire’ production process, 
professional skill, mutual tolerance of the members’ interests, values and aspirations. 
The source of disagreements and differences was constituted primarily by assessment, 
evaluation and attitudes manifesting themselves in questions of performance and income. 
These were usually treated in the publicity of the workshop and the plant.
The professional-technical and social-organizational skills of those participating in 
VGMKs -  partly because they have been socialized in a different type of work 
organization and management culture -  have developed unevenly. In setting up the inside 
contracting groups, participants have selected colleagues with appropriate professional 
competence and records of high performance relatively easily, but the ability to ‘deal 
with human relations’ has come to light with greater difficulty in the process of selection. 
The ‘visibility’ of such qualities and aptitudes was made difficult by the dominant pattern 
of the division of labour and by the socialization typical of full-time jobs.
The so-called articulated type of co-operation, which was in general use, made it 
mostly superfluous for workers to help one another and to assume responsibility for their 
colleagues. The applied methods of wage determination and prescriptions of performance
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requirements broken down to individual jobs made it difficult to recognize one another’s 
aspirations and needs. Performances exceeding the scope of individual jobs and collective 
actions were needed in critical (or crisis) situations only, and only a few workers with 
exceptionally strong power positions ( ‘core workers’) in the labour process had the ability 
to recognize these.
In the inside contracting groups the collective autonomy of group members became 
gradually legitimized, and the easing of direct dependence on the official managerial 
hierarchy revealed the participants’ ability to organize and control human relations. 
At the same time, the failure of several VGMKs, otherwise consisting of highly qualified 
members, can be explained by the unequal development of the participants’ social 
knowledge or, put in another way, organizational culture.
The varied experience offered by the emergence and operation of VGMKs reinforces 
the conclusions drawn from other analyses, namely, that segments of workers with 
high qualification and organizational-social skills have significant collective ability 
(or informal collective bargaining power) to affirm their interests at the workplace, 
exerting their influence in coalition with the lower and middle levels of management. This 
was also indicated by other empirical studies, which traced the fate of some work 
organization initiatives, technological development projects and incentive systems. 
The experience of VGMKs -  given their spread and the large mass of people participating 
in them (as we mentioned earlier, nearly 200,000 employees in the mid-1980s) -  is of 
greater significance than earlier sociological case studies assumed, because these inside 
contracting groups are of general relevance to understanding the nature of social change in 
Hungary.
Their experience demonstrates that considerable masses of workers were able to 
legitimize their demand for higher pay, their professional skills and practice, local 
knowledge and co-operative relations within the framework of VGMKs, despite the rigid 
hierarchical and bureaucratic organizations and central wage regulations in state- 
socialist firms. The same possibilities, though with different incomes, offered different 
segments of workers, including unskilled and semi-skilled as well as organizationally 
and/or socially marginalized ones (e.g. women) a new option, a scope for action, by 
giving them a chance to earn extra income and, last but not least, an opportunity to 
participate in the social-organizational learning process via the inside contracting 
groups.
The patterns of use of human resources and co-operation were different from those in 
full-time (or regular) jobs. The VGMKs built, operated and explored a set of social 
relations which were different from the clearly divided and defined hierarchical 
organizational structure of full-time employment based on maximum specialization 
(or on the Fordist principle of organization of work). The work performed in the VGMKs 
required considerable efforts and multi-skill use from their members. In turn, however, 
their members learned significant ‘organizational skills’ and a holistic approach not only 
to their work organization but to the operation of the plant, too.
The simultaneous participation in the over-specialized, individualized job structure in 
full-time employment and in ‘job empowerment’ in the VGMKs after regular working 
time enabled the members of these autonomous working groups to compare and critically 
evaluate this ‘double pattern’ or ‘double standard’ of work organization. In the course of 
contrasting these working experiences, VGMK members were able to develop richer 
technical-professional and social-organizational skills and knowledge.
Among them it was widely recognized that making sharp boundaries between certain 
phases of production (e.g. manufacturing, maintenance, programming, quality control, etc.) 
had reflected only administrative logic and did not serve flexibility (or smooth operation)
in the production process. The members o f these autonomous working groups 
organized their activities within organizational networks, integrating both horizontal 
and vertical relations.
Almost a decade development of VGMKs (1982-90) gave a chance for every tenth 
worker to participate in a working system based on ‘high involvement’ and to develop 
and use extensive networks within and outside the former socialist firms. These network- 
type relations can be distinguished from both hierarchical and market-type ones, because 
transactions between the economic actors involved were based neither on the logic of 
hierarchy (administrative order) nor on that of discrete market exchange. At this point we 
share the opinion of those who reject the view that VGMKs were basically governed by 
market principles:
The use o f internal market transactions to reduce the effects o f systematic uncertainties 
in the socialist firm is brought into sharper relief in a recent organizational innovation in 
Hungary -  the formation of semi-autonomous subcontracting units [i.e. VGMKs] inside the 
enterprise.
(Stark, 1985: 493)
We agree to the following diagnosis concerning the role of non-market-type 
regulation in the process of bidding of the VGMKs:
Each VGMKs leader wanted to submit forbids as many jobs as possible in his own area, because 
the additional resources of VGMKs facilitated the performance of his tasks and allowed him to
offer extra income to his workers__ In reality, bidding resulted from co-operation between
managers and some VGMK representatives.
(Neumann, 1988: 69)
The top management of the former socialist firms, however, were unable or, more 
precisely, unmotivated to integrate the lessons from the VGMKs’ activities into their 
methods and organization. The one-decade history of these innovative work 
organizations in the Hungarian firms questioned the efficiency of the bureaucratic 
regulation and management structure, and clearly demonstrated the advantages of 
network-based regulation within the business organization. The development of ‘social- 
organizational’ skills along with ‘technical-professional’ ones equipped the VGMKs’ 
members with the necessary skills and networking knowledge to create their own 
businesses and to use them as new entrepreneurs in the emerging market economy after 
the collapse of the socialist political-economic regime. A relatively easily definable 
community has emerged along the lines of the professional values that were developed 
and tested in the VGMKs (Kuczi and Mako, 1997).
Combined with ‘physical’ and ‘human resources’, the outcomes of this ‘dual pattern' 
of work organization became important new elements of ‘organization routines’ in the 
development of post-socialist firms. As one of the representatives of the evolutionary 
approach noted in connection with the importance of ‘organizational routines’ in the 
growth of firms:
The efficiency of a firm is a function of its routines, which are the product of its cumulative 
organizational history. Diffused throughout the organization, these routines are not embodied in 
any individual. As such, organizational routines take on a tacit nature, thus making articulation 
of such routines difficult.
(Peng and Heath, 1996: 496)
The experience of VGMKs became an integral part of organization and management 
development in Hungary. It is worth stressing again that the simultaneous functioning of
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the autonomous (or semi-autonomous) working groups and the over-centralized and 
specialized skill and manpower use in the state-socialist enterprises had diversified 
(or modernized) the methods of ‘operational management’. The lessons drawn from the 
activities of VGMKs given below well illustrate their significant role in changing 
normative, regulative and even cognitive components of the socialist firms as social 
institutions. These complex changes have greatly contributed to improving the learning 
capacity and adaptability of the former socialist firms.
First, co-operation is generated not only by hierarchical (bureaucratic) mechanisms, but 
also by the network-type social relations, which open up channels for action on the 
basis of the reciprocity principle. This means that, within the socialist firms where 
hierarchical order was the dominant mechanism in governing economic activities, from the 
beginning of the 1980s another governance mechanism, viz. the network, was also active.
Second, initiatives for change should not come only from the representatives 
of the mega-hierarchy (e.g. government ministries, party) or micro-hierarchy 
(e.g. top management of the firm). Various groups of rank-and-file employees having 
different degrees o f  autonomy might also play a significant role in moulding and 
influencing social relations both inside and outside the firm.
Third, the flexibility o f operation in VGMKs leads to an obvious criticism of the 
performance and quality of the firm’s management, questioning especially the necessity 
of the heavy and over-centralized organization structure of management. With their 
records of performance, these semi-autonomous groups undermined the raison d ’etre of 
certain functions and structures of management (e.g. the presence of the overpopulated 
groups of middle managers, the unnecessarily great number of levels of management, 
separation and specialization of such functions as manufacturing, quality control, 
staffing, designing, etc.). On the other hand, they also demonstrated the important role in 
the shopfloor-level bargaining process of supervisors, whose roles were generally 
underestimated and downgraded by their supervisors.
Fourth, the presence of bargaining between representatives of VGMKs and the 
management deregulated the trade unions’ control o f  the working conditions and wages. 
This deregulation has greatly contributed to the decline of trade union influence and 
increased the income inequalities between VGMK members and non-members at the 
same workplace, and, as a consequence, the process o f labour market segmentation 
within the former socialist firms accelerated.
Finally, it is worth noting that the remarkable performance of VGMKs not only 
challenged the existing structures and methods of management, but also enlarged the 
space for a social learning process and increased the possibilities of building up trust 
relations at the workplaces. The new model of direct interest representation of employees 
and co-ordination in the labour process emerged from the world of hidden and informal 
bargaining, and helped large segments of the workforce to learn how to shape the existing 
patterns of social relations at the workplace.
The next section of the paper focuses on recent experiences in workers’ participation 
at mass-production plants operating in the electric-electronic sector and on the diffusion 
of organizational innovations -  including teamwork, too -  in one of the economically 
most dynamic regions of Hungary.
Changing production paradigm in the 1990s: neo- instead of post-Fordism: 
results of international comparative projects
Many management scientists share the view that foreign direct investment (FDI) 
facilitates the transfer of modern management skills and organizations from the matured
market economies into the emerging, new market economies in the Central and Eastern 
European region (Child and Markoczy, 1993; Soulsby and Clark, 1996). Unfortunately 
there are few empirical studies on the changing patterns of labour processes in the 
transformation economies. It is even more difficult to find data on the changing task 
structure in an international perspective covering a long period. This lack of knowledge 
is partly due to the fact that social and political scientists have mostly ignored the micro­
level economic and political changes in the transformation process. Earlier, under state 
socialism, there was also little attention paid to the changing pattern of production 
paradigms during the 1970s and the 1980s (Mako, 1985a, 1985b). In the 1990s, the core 
interest of social scientists in Hungary as well as in the other transformation economies 
was focused on such major structural changes as privatization, creation of democratic 
institutions, the origin and composition of the new political and economic elite, 
unemployment and growing social inequalities (including the minorities) and, recently, 
the institutional problems of EU integration. Relatively little attention was devoted to 
understanding the impacts of globalization in the economy, especially in relation to the 
changing production paradigms.
In spite of this, there were some international comparative projects that tried to map 
the growing priorities of ‘co-operation’ or ‘employee participation’ in the labour process 
during the first decade of the emerging market economy in the CEE region and 
particularly in Hungary.
From among international comparative research projects, we are going to use 
the results of REGIS, an EU-supported project studying the regional innovation 
system and the diffusion of group or teamwork in one of the most dynamic 
economic regions of Hungary. The REGIS project was conducted in eleven European 
regions between 1996 and 1997; Baden-W urtenberg (Germany), SE Brabant 
(Netherlands), Styria (Austria), Tampere (Finland), Wales (UK), Walonia (Belgium), 
Basque Country (Spain), Centro (Portugal), Friuli (Italy), Szekesfehervar (Hungary) and 
Lower Silezia (Poland). In the EU member countries 833 firms and in the CEE regions 
(in Hungary and in Poland) 165 firms participated in the survey, which aimed to study 
various dimensions of the company and regional-level related innovation systems 
(Cook et a l ,  1998: 178).
Another project, initiated by Denki Rengo, the Japanese Confederation of Electric and 
Electronic Workers’ Unions, may help us to understand the growing necessity of co­
operation among blue-collar workers. The Denki Rengo International Survey -  initiated 
by the Japanese Denki Rengo Trade Union Confederation operating in the electric and 
electronic industries and co-ordinated by Prof. Akihiro Ishikawa, Chuo University -  was 
carried out in 1985, 1995 and 2000. The project core aim was to understand changes in 
firm-level labour relations, in the nature of working and in the quality of life. In 1985 ten 
countries, in 1995 fifteen countries and in 2000-1 fourteen countries participated in 
the survey (see Martin et al., 1998; Ishikawa et al., 2000).
Strong presence o f  group working at Hungarian firms in a comparative perspective: 
the case o f the REGIS project
The REGIS project survey asked managers about various forms of organizational 
innovations ( ‘leading-edge’ management concepts) and also which of them their 
company had introduced. In some cases there were very big differences between foreign- 
owned and Hungarian firms. The weakest differences were registered in the case of 
‘group work’ or ‘profit/cost centres’, which represent the patterns of teamwork. 
In comparing these forms of organizational innovation used in Hungarian-owned firms
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Table 2 Diffusion o f  organizational innovations in REGIS project firms, 1996 (%)
Forms o f organizational 
innovations
Hungarian- 
owned firms
Foreign-owned firms 
in Hungary
Other REGIS project 
regions’ firms
Total quality management (TQM) 18.4 37.5 46.3
Group-work 55.1 66.7 47.8
Profit or cost centres 44.9 62.5 32.7
Inter-organizational networking 34.7 37.5 20.0
Benchmarking 4.1 37.5 24.7
Flat hierarchies 22.4 50.0 39.5
Interdisciplinary design teams 18.4 33.3 22.2
Just-in-time delivery (JIT) 10.2 41.7 37.7
Outsourcing 8.2 29.2 22.2
System suppliers 10.2 20.8 n.d.
ISO 9000 34.7 62.5 52.0
Information technology (IT) 28.6 70.8 44.5
Average scores 24.1 45.8 35.4
Source: Mako and Ellingstad (2000: 352)
and in foreign-owned firms operating in Hungary to other REGIS project regions’ firms, 
we find that their presence in the firms in Hungary is stronger (see Table 2).
This relatively high rate of ‘group work’ and ‘profit/cost centres’ in Hungarian-owned 
firms and in foreign-owned firms operating in Hungary compared to the other REGIS 
regions can be partly explained by the institutional heritage of co-operation within the 
state-socialist firms (see our earlier remarks on the inside contracting groups called 
VGMKs and in detail in Mako and Simonyi (1992)). Another explanatory factor is the 
small size and the heavy export orientation of the country, which entail more 
co-operative labour relations (e.g. strikes in the Hungarian economy are much rarer than 
in Poland). Under these circumstances, both employers and employees are interested in 
developing and maintaining co-operative relations in the labour process to ensure the 
necessary flexibility and high-quality production in an environment of intense global 
competition (Boyer, 1998). (There is another interesting relation, too: according to the 
experiences of the REGIS project, leading firms in the field of ‘product and production 
process development’ have a higher rate of use of the ‘leading management concepts’ 
than the firms lagging behind them in these respects.)
Increasing participation o f  blue-collar workers in quality control: lessons from  the Denki 
Rengo International Survey
The aim of the Denki Rengo International Survey was to study the changing patterns of 
firm-level labour relation systems in an international comparative perspective.
By evaluating the changing task structure of blue-collar workers in the period between 
1985 and 2000 -  using the approach developed by the Belgian ‘Trend Study Group’ 
(Huys et al., 1999) -  the following patterns were identified. We may map the process of 
the so-called ‘de-concentration’ of labour process (i.e. the re-integration of preparatory 
or staff services, or part of them, such as planning, programming, maintenance, quality 
assurance, into the tasks of production workers) in the firms surveyed in the electric and 
electronic industries. For example, in such ‘matured’ capitalistic countries as Japan 
and Finland, the process of ‘de-concentration’ was fairly developed and the practice of 
neo-Fordism emerged already at the beginning of the 1990s. The former state-socialist
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Table 3 Changing task structure o f  blue-collar workers, 1995-2000 (%)
Country 1995 2000
Production- 
related tasks*
Production- 
supporting tasks
Production- 
related tasks*
Production- 
supporting tasks
China 74 26.9 76 32
Czech Republic 66.2 33.4 65 55
Finland 81.4 67.7 86 84i—'France 60 40 78 13
Hungary 58.9 40.7 57.0 51
Italy 63.7 47.1 65 32
Japan 59.9 112.6 53.0 116
Korea 55.3 42.9 85 45
Poland 74.6 13.7 59 41
ROC n.d. n.d. 38 34
Slovakia 79.2 31.2 78 31
Slovenia 68.7 23.8 70 42
Spain 87 16 97 1
USA n.d. n.d. 76 65
Average 70.2 48.2 68 48
Notes
* Production-related tasks =  machine work or assembly.
** Production-supporting tasks =  maintenance or repair +  quality control +  programming.
***In the case o f France, we had various problems with the sampling (see, for detail, Maurice, 2000: 159). 
M ethodological remark: the total o f the share o f tasks does not equal 100 per cent because, during interviews, we 
did not limit the number o f tasks to be selected.
firms belonged at the other extreme among the countries surveyed. In these firms, a 
radical change in the direction of ‘de-concentration’ was registered from five to ten years 
later. Integration of such tasks -  previously carried out by special groups -  as 
maintenance-repair, quality control and programming -  into the job of blue-collar 
workers became identifiable, with the exception of Slovakia. The most radical changes in 
‘production-supporting tasks’ were experienced in Poland (27.3 per cent), the Czech 
Republic (21.6 per cent), Slovenia (18.1 per cent) and Hungary (10.3 per cent). 
(Note: the share of ‘production-supporting tasks’ was the highest in Hungary during the 
2nd Denki Rengo Survey (1995): 40.7 per cent in comparison to the Czech (33.4 per 
cent), Slovakian (30.2 per cent), Slovenian (23.9 per cent) and Polish (13.7 per cent) 
plants.) For details see Table 3.
These changes in the task environment within post-socialist plants are the results of 
the strong pressure of multinationalization and the growing need for the co-operation of 
employees with management in the emergent market economies in the CEE region. 
(Note: to illustrate the impact of the restructuring process in the Hungarian economy, it is 
worth mentioning that 75 per cent of the country’s exports are targeted to the EU 
countries, whereas in the 1980s two-thirds of the country’s exports went to the former 
socialist countries.)
The characteristics of the work organization identified inform us about the emergence 
of the neo-Fordist production paradigm. Unfortunately, due to the methodological 
shortcomings of the research tools used in the Denki Rengo International Survey, we 
were not able to map variations in the forms or national patterns of the neo-Fordist 
practice of division of labour among the countries participating in the project.
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Table 4 Participation o f  blue-collar workers in quality control activity
Country Share o f  tasks o f  quality control carried out by blue-collar 
workers (%)
1985 1990 2000
Hungary 5.3 25.1 29.0
Poland 6.9 4.5 8.0
Slovenia 7.3 17.9 21.0
Source: M ako (2001)
To illustrate the effects of both the political-economic-system specific changes in the 
Hungarian economy and the generic changes produced by the international division of 
labour (accelerated by globalization and ICT technologies) it is worth mentioning the 
role of the increasing participation of workers in the labour process. For example, 
the participation of blue-collar workers in quality-control-related activities has 
substantially increased in the period between 1985 and 2000 in the post-socialist firms 
participating in the Denki Rengo Survey (see Table 4).
The most spectacular increase in the participation of blue-collar workers in quality 
control was registered in the Hungarian (from 5.3 per cent in 1985 to 29 per cent in 2000) 
and the Slovenian plants (from 7.3 per cent in 1985 to 21 per cent in 2000). In Poland the 
autonomy of blue-collar workers in quality control was weak. In the case of Hungary, 
the institutional legacy of the so-called ‘economic associations’ or ‘autonomous working 
groups’ of the 1980s (in Slovenia the ‘self-management system’) may partly explain the 
visible differences in employee participation in comparison to the Polish case.
Conclusions
In the first decade of the transformation process in the Hungarian economy (i.e. in the 1990s), 
few empirical studies dealt with changes in the labour processes. And even the majority of 
these studies was primarily interested in measuring changes in employees’ attitudes and 
satisfaction, while relatively little attention was paid to the shifting production paradigm 
and its impact on job structure, group work, etc. In this respect we should mention another 
pattern of thought popular among social scientists in the region: they have overestimated the 
effects of the social-economic restructuring process related to transformation from the state- 
socialist to market economy and underestimated the so-called ‘generic changes in the 
division of labour’. Furthermore, the process of privatization and the establishment of 
the new political and economic elites have diverted attention from the changes within the 
business organization. This field of activity, which sociologists have ‘deserted’, has become 
an almost exclusive field of interest for management scientists and consultants.
The examples taken from international studies (the REGIS project and the Denki 
Rengo International Survey) carried out in Hungary in the last decade illustrate the 
relative popularity of group work and active employee participation in the labour 
process. These developments can be explained partly by the institutional/cultural 
heritage of the inside contracting groups (VGMKs) of the 1980s and partly by the 
intensified diffusion of organizational innovations resulting from the strong presence of 
Hungarian subsidiaries of multinational corporations.
On evaluating the paradigmatic implications of these changes and strategies of leading 
edge manufacturers in the world, we may say that we are experiencing the emergence of
neo-Fordism characterized by an increasing but limited involvement of blue-collar
workers in production-related ‘supporting tasks’.
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